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Abstract
We study noncooperative household models with two agents and
several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart
to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation
of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary
model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there
are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties
are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn
regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model
against noncooperative alternatives.
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Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget con-
straint implies strong testable restrictions on the properties of demand func-
tions. Empirical applications to data on households however often reject
these restrictions. In particular, such data frequently show a failure of Slut-
sky symmetry - the restriction of symmetry on the matrix of compensated
price responses (see for example Deaton (1990), Browning and Meghir (1991),
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998)).
From the theoretical point of view, the inadequacy of the single consumer
model as a description of decision making for households with more than one
member has also long been recognised. Attempts to reconcile this model with
the existence of several sets of individual preferences have been made for in-
stance by Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1974, 1991) but rely upon restrictive
assumptions about preferences or within-household decision mechanisms (see
Bergstrom, 1989; Cornes and Silva, 1999).
A large body of recent research has investigated models accommodating
alternative descriptions of within-household decision-making processes. Ef-
¯ciency of household decisions holds in a number of models of household
behaviour which have been suggested: for instance in the Nash bargaining
models of Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981) and McEl-
roy (1990), and in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994)
and Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994). However, it is not a property of
noncooperative models such as those of Ulph (1988) and Chen and Woolley
(2001).
An important advance is made by Browning and Chiappori (1998), who
show that under the sole assumption of e±cient within-household decision
making, the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix for demands from a k member
household is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank k ¡ 1.
Chiappori and Ekeland (2006a) establish not only that e±ciency implies a
rank k¡1 deviation but also that a rank k¡1 deviation implies the existence
of preferences compatible with e±cient behaviour. Chiappori and Ekeland
(2006b) show that for these preferences to be identi¯ed it is required to
know which goods are private and which are public and that it is su±cient
for identi¯cation to assume the existence of exclusive goods. Browning and
Chiappori report tests on Canadian data which reject symmetry for couples,
but not for single individual households. The hypothesis that the departure
from symmetry for the sample of couples has rank 1, as implied by the
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assumption of e±ciency, is also not rejected.
These results not only ¯ll a gap in our theoretical understanding of de-
mand behaviour but also open the prospect of reconciling demand theory
and data on consumer behaviour. The work of Browning and Chiappori
(1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006a) is important in showing that the
assumption of e±ciency generates testable restrictions on household demand
functions, clearly distinguishing the collective model from both the unitary
and the entirely unrestricted case.
In this paper we explore the same question of the testable restrictions
implied by an alternative structural assumption on within household inter-
actions. The model considered is the principal alternative to both the unitary
and collective models, that of noncooperative demand behaviour with vol-
untarily contributed public goods. This model warrants attention in its own
right as the only currently widely discussed alternative to fully e±cient mod-
els of the sort described above. It is also interesting in so far as the equilibria
in this model can be considered as the fallback position in bargaining models
as suggested, for example, in Woolley (1988), Lundberg and Pollak (1993)
and Chen and Woolley (2001).
Models of voluntarily contributed public goods have relevance beyond
analysis of household demand. When they involve more than two players,
these models can be used to represent a variety of situations involving private
contributions to public goods either in the national or international context.
What distinguishes what we have termed the \household Nash equilibrium
model" from the general Nash equilibrium model is the small number of
agents, which is two in the case considered here.
We derive results for all types of equilibria, including those in which
partners do and do not contribute jointly to a common set of public goods.
In section 2 we lay out the general framework. In section 3, we consider
the case in which there are jointly contributed public goods. We show that
equilibrium quantities vary with prices and household income in ways com-
patible with the adding up and homogeneity properties of unitary demands
and that negativity and symmetry properties will generally be violated, as
in the collective model. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix,
and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric matrix and
another of bounded rank, though its rank generally exceeds the deviation to
be expected in a collective setting. We establish also the numbers of public
and private goods required for this to constitute a testable restriction on be-
haviour. Section 4 is devoted to the properties of demands in the case of no
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jointly contributed public goods. Adding up holds, homogeneity may fail and
the rank of the departure from negativity and symmetry is shown to be sim-
ilar in rank to that when public goods are jointly contributed. These results
suggest that the properties of the Slutsky matrix do provide a potential ba-
sis for testing not only the Browning-Chiappori assumption of e±ciency but
also other models within the class of those based on individual optimisation.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The general model
Consider a household with two individuals, A and B. The household spends
on a set of m private goods q 2 Rm and n public goods Q 2 Rn. The
quantities of private goods purchased by the individuals are qA and qB with
total household quantities q ´ qA + qB. The quantities of public goods
purchased by the household are Q with individual contributions QA and QB
and Q ´ QA+QB: Individual utility functions are uA(qA;Q) and uB(qB;Q),
assumed increasing and di®erentiable in all arguments, so that individual
preferences are de¯ned over the sum of contributions to the public goods.
The partners have incomes of yA and yB: Household income is denoted y ´
yA + yB. Prices of private and public goods respectively are the vectors p
and P.
Each person decides on the purchases made from their income so as to
maximise their utility subject to the spending decisions of their partner. We






















B ¸ 0; q
B ¸ 0
where inequalities should be read where appropriate as applying to each
element of the relevant vector.
A household Nash equilibrium consists of a set of quantities (qA;qB;QA;QB)
simultaneously solving these two problems. The existence of at least one such
equilibrium is established in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2005). The
equilibrium need not be unique, though Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986,
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1992), Fraser (1992) and Lechene and Preston (2005) provide su±cient con-
ditions, essentially involving normality of both public and private goods, for
uniqueness of certain sorts of equilibria.
In any equilibrium, public goods can be divided into two types - those to
which only one partner contributes and those to which both do. We refer to
the former as individually contributed public goods, and denote the quantity
vectors for such goods1 QA and QB, the respective prices PA and PB and
their dimensions nA and nB. Without loss of generality we assume nA ¸ nB.
The latter type, on the other hand, are referred to as jointly contributed
public goods, with quantity vector denoted X, prices R and dimension nX.
Individual contributions to these public goods are denoted XA and XB.
Equilibria can be distinguished into those in which there are and are not
jointly contributed public goods. Those in which nX ¸ 1 are called, for
reasons which will become apparent, income pooling equilibria and those in
which nX = 0 are called separate spheres equilibria.
It is useful to recognise that the problems can be rewritten to have part-
ners e®ectively choosing the levels of the public goods for the household,
subject to the constraint that this level is greater than or equal to the con-
tribution of the other agent. Given that yA = y¡p0qB ¡P 0QB; and similarly





A;Q) s. t. p
0q
A + P
0Q · y ¡ p
0q








B;Q) s. t. p
0q
B + P
0Q · y ¡ p
0q
A; Q ¸ Q
A q
B ¸ 0:
3 Income pooling equilibria
3.1 Income pooling
In an income pooling equilibrium, the solution to each partner's problem
coincides with that in which they choose only over their privately contributed
1Note that subscripts A and B are used to distinguish goods contributed exclusively by
individuals A and B whereas superscripts A and B distinguish contributions by individuals
A and B (to any good).
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QB ¸ 0; X ¸ X
A; q
B ¸ 0:








































where fA(:), F A(:), fB(:), F B(:), GA(:), GA(:) are conditional Marshallian
demand functions corresponding to the two partners' preferences and to-
gether satisfying the usual demand properties.













Qj for i = A;B; with respect
to income y, price vectors p and P and individually contributed public goods
quantities of the other partner Qj respectively.
Note that (1) to (4) de¯ne 2m+nA+nB equilibrium equations in 2m+nA+
nB quantities (qA;QA;qB;QB) independently of (5) and (6). Substituting
solutions to these equations into (5) or (6) will give the set of income pooling
equilibria. Furthermore the set of solutions to these equations plainly depend
only upon (y;p;P) and in particular do not depend upon the distribution of
income within the household. This well known \income pooling" result is
the source of the name given to such equilibria. This result is well known
and has been discussed by many authors. Warr (1983) established income
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pooling for the case of a single public good and Kemp (1984) extended the
claim to the case of multiple public goods, assuming interior equilibrium.
Kemp's proof is queried by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) who o®er
an alternative proof.
Though often found surprising, the source of the result is easily illus-
trated2 for the case of only one private good and one jointly contributed
public good in Figure 1. Any allocation of total household income y across
the three goods qA, qB and X can be represented as a point in the triangular
area ADO with the shares of household income spent on private goods rep-
resented by the distances along the axes and the remaining share allocated
to the public good given by the perpendicular distance to the boundary AD.
Given any amount spent on the private good of individual A, the remainder
of household income is spent on goods of interest to individual B and the line
AEB represents B's preferred allocation between qB and X. Correspondingly,
the line DEC represents A's preferred allocation between qA and X given any
amount spent on qB. The line AEB and DEC represent graphically the reac-
tion functions implied by equations (1) and (2). The intersection at E shows
an allocation over the three goods with which each partner is content given
the spending decisions of the other. This point is clearly unique if the slope
of AEB is always more negative than -1 and that of DEC always between 0
and -1 which will be the case if X and q are normal in the preferences of A
and B. This point will be an income pooling equilibrium if it involves neither
partner spending more than their private income on their own private good.
Individual income shares yA=y and yB=y are shown on the diagram and in
this case exceed household budget shares for the private goods at E so that E
is the unique household Nash equilibrium. Furthermore it is clear that small
changes in the income shares will not alter the location of this equilibrium,
which is the income pooling result. Separate spheres equilibria will pertain
in cases of su±ciently extreme income shares and the locus of all equilibria
is given by the line CEB.
2Ley (1996) presents several diagrammatic representations of the Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986) model though not that of Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Household Nash equilibrium
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3.2 Jointly contributed public goods
Satisfaction of both (5) and(6) with multiple jointly contributed public goods
at anything other than isolated values of (y;p;P) clearly requires a certain co-
incidence in preferences over public goods between the two partners. Brown-
ing, Chiappori and Lechene (2005) demonstrate that generically nX · 1
so that typically there will not exist more than a single jointly contributed
public good in equilibrium. More precisely, given a suitable topology on pref-
erences, there is no open set in the space of the couple's preferences, incomes
and prices on which nX > 1 in equilibrium. This is not to say, however, that
there are not subspaces of preferences within which equilibria with nX > 1
can hold on an open set of values for (y;p;P). What is required is that the
partners' marginal rates of substitution between jointly contributed public
goods should coincide at all equilibrium quantities of the goods over such
a set. That is possible, for example, if preferences over jointly contributed
public goods are separable and identical for the two partners. It is, in fact,
possible even without such separability if preferences over those individually
contributed goods from which there is not separability are also identical be-
tween the partners since there exist equilibria with quantities of these goods
also identical in equilibrium3. Lechene and Preston (2006) demonstrate the
possibility of such cases. Of course, these cases are not robust to small inde-
pendent perturbations in the partners' preferences but identity and separa-
bility of preferences over subsets of public goods may make sense in certain
cases - for example, if the subutility function re°ects an agreed technology
for producing some intermediate good or if, say, the goods in question relate
to children and the subutility re°ects an agreed welfare function for the chil-
dren. In any case, we present results covering both the generic case and the
possibility that nX > 1.
3Speci¯cally, interior equilibria with nX > 1 exist on an open set of values for (y;p;P)
if private goods can be partitioned, qi = (qi
0;qi
1); i = A;B, in such a way that individual
preferences take the weakly separable form
ui(qi;Q) = Ài(qi
0;Qi;º(qi
1;X)) i = A;B
for some Ài(:;:;:); i = A;B and some common subutility function º(:;:). In such a case,
marginal rates of substitution between public goods in X are, for each partner, the same
function of quantities qi
1 and X and there exist equilibria with qA
1 = qB
1 so that these
marginal rates of substitution coincide as required. Such preferences obviously include,
for instance, the cases both of common separability of public goods (qi = qi
0; X = Q) and
of identical preferences (qi = qi
1; X = Q).
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3.3 Adding up and homogeneity
In what follows we assume uniqueness of the equilibrium and denote the
mappings from (y;p;P) to the unique individual equilibrium goods vectors
by µA(y;p;P), £A(y;p;P), µB(y;p;P), £B(y;p;P) and to the jointly con-













denote the household private and public goods vectors. Note that quan-
tities are uniquely determined as functions of the same economic determi-
nants y, p and P as would be the case under the \unitary" model where
the household maximises a household utility function given the household
budget constraint. Distinguishing unitary and noncooperative household be-
haviour therefore requires that we establish whether these equilibrium quan-
tities have properties dissimilar to demands in unitary households. Browning
and Chiappori (1998) provide such an analysis for the collective model, and
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2004) examine the relationship between
collective and unitary models.
The properties of unitary demands are the standard Hurwicz-Uzawa (1971)
integrability requirements of adding up, homogeneity, negativity and sym-
metry. It is easy to establish that the household Nash equilibrium quantities
satisfy adding-up and homogeneity.
Theorem 1 In income pooling equilibrium, household Nash equilibrium de-
mands satisfy
1. (Adding up) p0µ(y;p;P) + P 0£(y;p;P) = y
2. (Homogeneity) µ(¸y;¸p;¸P) = µ(y;p;P) and £(¸y;¸p;¸P) = £(y;p;P)
for any ¸ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.
1. Adding up of demands in household Nash equilibrium follows from
the fact that the partners are on their individual budget constraints
and the sum of their demands therefore satis¯es the household budget
constraint.
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2. Equilibrium quantities satisfying (1) to (6) will satisfy homogeneity
given homogeneity of the individual demand functions.
3.4 Negativity and symmetry
Negativity and symmetry are less simply dealt with. These are concerned in
the case of the unitary model with the properties of the Slutsky matrix, the
matrix of price responses at ¯xed household utility. Since household utility
is unde¯ned in a noncooperative setting, no such matrix is de¯ned but we
can adopt the Browning and Chiappori (1998) notion of the \pseudo-Slutsky















composed in a comparable way from derivatives of the equilibrium house-
hold quantities with respect to prices and income. This is what would be
calculated as the Slutsky matrix if the household were treated as behaving
according to the unitary model. The properties of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix
can then be examined by relating its terms to the \true" compensated price
e®ects on the functions fA(:); fB(:); F A(:), F B(:), GA(:) and GB(:) which
correspond to the individual utility functions assumed to have given rise to
the observed behaviour of the household.
Substituting the equilibrium functions into (1) to (6) and di®erentiating,
































where the matrices M, N1 and N2 are de¯ned below.
The M matrix captures interactions between the goods purchases of the
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´ D1 + D2:
The components A1, B1, C1 and D1 arise from interaction through the budget
constraint, as greater purchases of any good individually contributed by one
partner decreases the amount left over from the household budget for pur-
chases by the other. These matrices each have rank 1, being each the outer
product of a vector of income derivatives and a vector of prices.
The components A2, B2, C2 and D2 arise from the e®ect of one indi-
vidual's purchases of individually contributed public goods on the prefer-
ence ordering of the other over the goods individually contributed by the
other. Such terms are generically of rank nB, min(m+nB;nA), min(nX;nB)
and min(nX;nA), respectively4. They disappear if either each person's pref-
erences over their contributed goods are separable from the public goods
individually contributed by the other or if all public goods are jointly con-
tributed5. Since the special case in which, for whichever of these reasons,
A2, B2, C2 and D2 disappear provides interesting simpli¯cations of results, in
what follows we will refer to it repeatedly as contributory separability.
Taking these observations together, we see that the matrices A, B, C and
D are therefore of rank 1 + nB, min(m + nB;1 + nA), min(nX;1 + nB) and
min(nX;1 + nA),
4Each has only nB, nA, nB and nA non zero columns, respectively, corresponding to
the number of public goods individually contributed by the other but in the case of B2,
C2 and D2 this determines the rank only if the numbers of rows m + nB, nX and nX,
respectively, are not short of nA.
5The latter of these is the case considered in Lechene and Preston (2005)
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p ¡ F B



























and are composed of conventional income and price e®ects, excepting that
it is necessary to recognise in N2 that increases in the prices of the public
goods individually contributed by one partner decrease the amount left over
from the household budget for purchases by the other.
The system (8) is overdetermined, speci¯cally in the ¯nal 2nX lines which
imply alternative expressions for dX. With nX = 1 compatibility is ensured
by adding up, whereas for nX > 1 similar issues arise to those discussed
above concerning the nongenericity of such cases. If we let ¹ M, ¹ N1 and ¹ N2
denote the submatrices of M, N1 and N2 obtained by deleting the ¯nal nX








































































Im 0 Im 0
0 InA 0 0
0 0 0 InB+nX
1
A
is an appropriate aggregating matrix.
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The pseudo-Slutsky matrix now follows from:









































p + F A
y qA0 F A
PA + F A
y Q0
A 0 F A











p + F B
y qB0 0 F B
PB + F B
y Q0
B F B


















































Note that the terms in © are all elements of the underlying symmetric
and negative semide¯nite true individual conditional Slutsky matrices corre-














































Everything is now in place for the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 In an income pooling equilibrium, the pseudo-Slutsky matrix
can be decomposed as
ª = ª
A + ª
B + ¢1 + ¢2 + ¤
where
rank(¢1) · rank(B) · min(1 + nA;m + nB)
rank(¢2) · rank(A) · 1 + nB
rank(¤) · nX ¡ 1
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and
rank(¢1 + ¢2 + ¤) · n + min(1;m ¡ max(nA ¡ nB;1)):
Proof of Theorem 2.
See the Appendix.
The individual Slutsky matrices ªA and ªB are symmetric and negative
semide¯nite and so therefore is their sum. The deviation from conventional
demand properties is therefore determined by the properties of ¢1+¢2+¤.
In the general case where the number of private goods is at least two and
two partners contribute to roughly similar numbers of public goods then
the rank of the departure from a negative and semide¯nite pseudo-Slutsky
matrix is therefore at most n+1, one more than the number of public goods.
Provided that this condition holds, it is immaterial whether public goods are
jointly or individually contributed since, say, an increase in nX matched by
a corresponding fall in nA + nB simply results in o®setting changes in the
ranks of ¤ and ¢1 + ¢2.
Although the theorem establishes only a bound on the rank of the sum of
the matrices ¢1 + ¢2 + ¤, inspection of the form of these matrices suggests
that this bound will generically be attained6.
To reduce the rank of the departure further requires reduction in the rank
of either A or B and the most obvious restrictions to achieve this are sepa-
rability restrictions. In particular, the case which we labelled contributory
separability reduces A and B to rank 1 matrices and therefore in the generic
case of nX = 1 reduces the rank of the departure dramatically to 2, a small
number but still one more than the same departure in the collective model7
(Browning and Chiappori 1998). Intermediate cases corresponding to partial
separability will give departures of intermediate rank.
6Generically, only a single public good is jointly contributed in income pooling equilibria
in which case ¤ disappears. The matrices ¢1 and ¢2 are both matrix products in which
the factors of lowest rank are B and A respectively and therefore the rank of their sum will
generically be the sum of the ranks of A and B. By \generically", we mean holding on an
open set in the space of the couple's preferences, incomes and prices under some suitable
topology.
7This is as observed in Lechene and Preston 2005, whose results are substantially




In separate spheres equilibrium, by contrast, there are no jointly contributed
public goods, nX = 0 and partners contribute to disjoint subsets of public
goods. The term is taken from Lundberg and Pollak (1993) who consider
such a case as the threat point in a household bargaining model. All goods
are individually contributed and household spending on each of the goods
to which either partner contributes is constrained by their own individual
























QB ¸ 0; q
B ¸ 0:















and equilibrium demands depend on the distribution of income.
Assuming again uniqueness, we can write the quantities solving the sys-
tem of equations (9) to (12) as functions ~ µA(yA;yB;p;P), ~ £A(yA;yB;p;P),
~ µB(yA;yB;p;P) and ~ £B(yA;yB;p;P) and household demands as
~ µ(y
A;y
B;p;P) = ~ µ
A(y
A;y











Even to de¯ne the pseudo-Slutsky matrix in such a setting presents a
problem as these equilibrium demands are not functions of household income.
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We consider two alternative approaches to dealing with this. On the one hand
we can de¯ne individual pseudo-Slutsky matrices, ~ ªA and ~ ªB, by taking
derivatives with respect to individual incomes8
~ ª
i ´
µ ~ µp ~ µP









While having the merit of consistency with the noncooperative model un-
der consideration, these are plainly not what would be computed by someone
¯tting a conventional unitary demand system to household data. To under-
stand what such an exercise would produce, we need a way of calculating the
derivative of household demands with respect to household income. To this
end we de¯ne an income allocation function specifying individual incomes
as a function of household income, prices, and any other relevant household
characteristics9 Z, yA = Á(y;p;P;Z); yB = y ¡ Á(y;p;P;Z) so that we can















µ ~ £A(Á(y;p;P;Z);y ¡ Á(y;p;P;Z);p;P)
~ £B(Á(y;p;P;Z);y ¡ Á(y;p;P;Z);p;P)
¶
:
and continue to de¯ne a household pseudo-Slutsky matrix ª through (7). The
empirical investigator needs only to estimate µ(y;p;P;Z) and £(y;p;P;Z)
8We owe the idea to consider the properties of these individualised pseudo-Slutsky
matrices to Martin Browning.
9Though we do not explore the role played by the variables Z they can be seen as
playing a role analogous to the \distribution factors" in Browning and Chiappori 1998.
Their presence in Á o®ers an interpretation for why characteristics not associated with
preferences might be found to in°uence household demands in the current setting just as
they do in the collective setting. The way in which they could do so would, as in that
paper, clearly be heavily restricted, entering as they do only through the scalar function
Á.
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and is not required to know the form of the underlying function Á(y;p;P;Z)
beyond conditioning on an appropriate set of potential distribution factors
Z.
We thus have two di®erent types of equilibrium demand functions and
investigate the properties of both.
4.2 Adding up and homogeneity
Whilst it is obvious that adding-up continues to hold, homogeneity is no
longer as simple.
Theorem 3 In separate spheres equilibrium, household Nash equilibrium de-
mands satisfy
1. (Adding up)
² p0µ(y;p;P) + P 0£(y;p;P) = y
² p0~ µ(yA;yB;p;P) + P 0~ £(yA;yB;p;P) = yA + yB
2. (Homogeneity)
² µ(¸y;¸p;¸P) = µ(y;p;P) and £(¸y;¸p;¸P) = £(y;p;P) for any
¸ > 0 only if Á(¸y;¸p;¸P;Z) = ¸Á(y;p;P;Z).
² ~ µ(¸yA;¸yB;¸p;¸P) = ~ µ(yA;yB;p;P) and ~ £(¸yA;¸yB;¸p;¸P) =
~ £(yA;yB;p;P) for any ¸ > 0
Proof of Theorem 3.
1. Adding up of demands follows from the fact that the partners are on
their individual budget constraints.
2. Homogeneity of ~ µ and ~ £ follows from homogeneity of the individual
demand functions but this guarantees homogeneity of µ and £ only if
individual incomes vary homogeneously with household incomes and
prices.
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4.3 Negativity and symmetry
As in the income pooling case, we substitute the equilibrium functions into
(9) to (12) and di®erentiate, to derive, in this case, two systems of equations
for equilibrium quantity responses.








































































where the matrices M, N A
1 , N B
1 and N2 are de¯ned below.
The M matrix, common to the two systems, captures interactions be-






















and capture only the e®ects of individually contributed public goods pur-
chases on partners' preference orderings over their individually contributed
goods. A and B are generically of rank nB and min(nA;m+nB), respectively,
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and reduce to null matrices leaving M as simply an identity matrix in the
case of contributory separability.
The N A
1 , N B




















































and are composed of conventional income and price e®ects.
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while ³A, ³B and ³ are vectors.
Thus the comparable result to Theorem 2 for the separate spheres case
is as follows.
Theorem 4 In a separate spheres equilibrium, the pseudo-Slutsky matrices
can be decomposed as
ª = ª
A + ª













1) · rank(B) = min(nA;m + nB)
rank(¢2) = rank(¢
i
2) · rank(A) = nB
rank(K) = rank(K
i) = 1; i = A;B
and






· n + min(1;m ¡ max(nA ¡ nB;1)); i = A;B:
Proof of Theorem 4.
See the Appendix.
Perhaps somewhat remarkably, we ¯nd the rank of the departure from
conventional demand properties to be exactly the same as in the income
pooling case. The typical rank of the departure is again n + 1, one more
than the number of public goods, a result which therefore applies to any
type of equilibrium. It is therefore immaterial to the generic rank of the de-
parture not only how many public goods are jointly contributed but indeed
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whether any are jointly contributed at all. As in the case of income pool-
ing, one would expect this bound on the rank to be generically attained10.
Again separability restrictions on preferences will reduce this rank and, in
particular, complete contributory separability would in this case lead A and
B to disappear, reducing the rank of the departure to 1, the same rank of
departure as found in the collective model11.
10The ranks of K, KA and KB are always 1. The matrices ¢1 and ¢2, as in the income
pooling case, are both matrix products and their sum will generically have rank equal to
the sum of the ranks of A and B. The same holds for the sums of ¢A
1 and ¢A




11The fact that the rank reduction in this case is greater than under income pooling
arises because, with no public goods being jointly contributed, contributory separability
constitutes a more demanding restriction.
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5 Empirical testing
Theorems 2 and 4 establish a common bound for the rank of the departure
of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix ª from a symmetric and negative semide¯nite
matrix. This bound is n + 1 (assuming nA ¡ nB is unknown). This sec-
tion assesses the usefulness of this bound for testing either cooperative or
noncooperative behaviour.
Note ¯rstly that, unless n = 0 in which case noncooperative behaviour
is e±cient, then the departure under Nash equilibrium is greater than the
rank 1 departure found under the collective model. Browning and Chiappori
(1998) discuss how to test a rank 1 departure by testing the rank of ª ¡ª0.
If such tests fail to reject a rank 1 departure for couples then the results
above establish clearly that cooperative behaviour cannot be rejected against
noncooperative behaviour for any number of public goods.
What, however, if cooperative behaviour is rejected? Is it possible to
use properties of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix to test compatibility with non-
cooperative behaviour of the sort analysed here? The ¯rst point to note in
this respect is that the nature of the departure depends upon the number
of public goods. This makes sense. In the cooperative case the rank of the
departure is 1 because all interaction arises through the single dimension of
the sharing rule. In the noncooperative case interaction arises through the
public goods and it is natural that the rank of the departure should depend
upon how many public goods there are. There is an important implication of
this. Either one knows how many goods are publicly consumed in the house-
hold or one can only test noncooperative behaviour jointly with a hypothesis
about the number of public goods.
Lemma 3 in the Appendix12 establishes equivalence between departure
from symmetry of no more than a given rank and an associated bound on
the rank of the skew symmetric matrix ª ¡ ª0. In particular, it shows that
if ª ¡ ª0 is known to have rank at most s then it is possible to write ª as
the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank at most r whenever
















(ª ¡ ª0) = 0
12This result generalises Lemma 1 of Browning and Chiappori 1998 to cover departures
of any rank.
245 EMPIRICAL TESTING
and the rank of ª ¡ ª0 cannot exceed one less than its dimension n + m. A
departure from symmetry of rank at most n+1 is therefore restrictive only if
2n+3 < n+m¡1. It must therefore be the case that m ¸ n+5 in order to
test for noncooperative behaviour with n public goods. For example, to test
for noncooperative behaviour with one public good requires at least 7 goods
in total of which 6 are private. If this is so then the hypothesis is testable.
256 CONCLUSION
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we establish properties of demands in the Nash equilibrium
with two agents and voluntarily contributed public goods. This noncoop-
erative model is the polar case to the cooperative model of Browning and
Chiappori (1998) within the class of those models based on individual optimi-
sation. In reality, neither the assumption of fully e±cient cooperation nor of
complete absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely accurate descrip-
tion of typical household spending behaviour and analysis of such extreme
cases can be seen as a ¯rst step towards understanding of a more adequate
model.
We show that the nature of the departure from unitary demand properties
in household Nash equilibrium is qualitatively similar to that in collectively
e±cient models in that negativity and symmetry of compensated price re-
sponses is not guaranteed. The counterpart to the Slutsky matrix can be
shown to depart from negativity and symmetry by a matrix of bounded rank
but this rank typically exceeds that found in the collective model unless
strong auxiliary restrictions are placed on preferences. This constitutes a
testable restriction on household demand functions provided the number of
private goods is large enough relative to the number of public goods. Future
work will explore su±cient conditions for consistency with noncooperative
equilibrium within the household.
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from which the result is immediate.
Proof of Theorem 2.






I + AB(I ¡ AB)¡1 ¡A(I ¡ BA)¡1 0
¡B(I ¡ AB)¡1 I + BA(I ¡ BA)¡1 0










































































The rank of ¢1 cannot exceed the rank of B which is at most min(1 +
nA;m + nB) and that of ¢2 cannot exceed the rank of A which is at most
1 + nB, each being de¯ned as products involving these matrices.
The rank of ¤ cannot exceed nX since it contains only nX non-zero rows.
From Lemma 1,
R















































































by standard properties of the Slutsky matrix. Therefore the rank of ¤X
cannot exceed nX ¡ 1 and neither therefore can that of ¤.
The rank of ¢1 + ¢2 + ¤ cannot be greater than the sum of their ranks
considered individually which is n+min(1;m¡nA+nB). This number cannot
exceed the dimension n+m of the (square) matrix ª but can equal it in the
one case m = 1 and nA = nB. In this case it becomes relevant that ¢1, ¢2






































































































This means that their sum cannot be of full rank and the maximum rank
is reduced by 1 in this instance. (This is simply a consequence of adding
up. Since household demands must satisfy the household budget constraint,
Engel and Cournot aggregation must still hold for µ and £ and ª must be
singular as are ªA and ªB.)
The rank of the departure is therefore bounded from above by n +
min(1;m ¡ max(nA ¡ nB;1)).
Proof of Theorem 4.




I + AB(I ¡ AB)¡1 ¡A(I ¡ BA)¡1





























































































































The rank of ¢1 and ¢i
1, i = A;B, cannot exceed the rank of B which is at
most min(nA;m + nB) and that of ¢2 and ¢i
2, i = A;B, cannot exceed the
rank of A which is at most nB, each being de¯ned as products involving these
matrices. Moreover, K and Ki, i = A;B, being matrix products involving an
outer product of vectors13, have rank 1.
The rank of ¢1+¢2+K and of ¢i
1+¢i
2+Ki, i = A;B, cannot be greater
than the sum of the ranks of the component matrices considered individually
which is, in each case, n+min(1;m¡nA +nB). This number cannot exceed
the dimension n + m of the (square) matrix ª but can equal it in the one
case m = 1 and nA = nB. In this case it becomes relevant that ¢1, ¢2, K,
¢i
1, ¢i






































































































= 1 ¡ 1 = 0:
Thus the maximum rank is reduced by 1 in this instance and the rank of
the departure is therefore bounded from above by n+min(1;m¡max(nA ¡
nB;1)).
Lemma 3 Let ª be a real k £k matrix such that the rank of ª¡ª0 cannot
exceed s. Then ª can be written as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a
matrix of rank at most r if and only if either (i) 2r+1 ¸ s or (ii) 2r+1 < s
and ª ¡ ª0 has rank at most 2r.
13By adding up, it is impossible for either N A
1 or N B
1 to be zero vectors so these matrices
have rank of exactly 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3.
For any real k £ k matrix ª the matrix ª ¡ ª0 is skew symmetric and
therefore has even rank. If the rank of ª ¡ª0 cannot exceed s then its rank
is therefore at most s if s is even and at most s ¡ 1 if s is odd.
Suppose ª can be written as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix
of rank at most r. Then
















which has rank at most 2r. If s is even then the rank is therefore at most
min(2r;s) whereas if s is odd then the rank is therefore at most min(2r;s¡1).
In each case the bound of 2r is restrictive only if 2r + 1 < s.
Conversely, suppose ª ¡ ª0 has rank at most 2r. (Note that this holds
for any matrix ª if the rank of ª¡ª0 cannot exceed s and 2r+1 ¸ s.) Since
ª¡ª0 is real and skew symmetric, it is possible (see, for example, Theorem
2.5 in Thompson 1988) to write ª ¡ª0 = ULU0 for some orthogonal matrix


















Call this matrix S. Then ª can be written as the sum of a symmetric matrix
and a matrix of rank at most r
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